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Abstract Environmental policies are a significant cornerstone of a developed 
economy, but the question that arises is whether such policies lead to a 
sustainable growth path. It is clear that the energy sector plays a pivotal role 
in environmental policies, and although the current literature has focused on 
examining the link between energy consumption and economic growth 
through an abundance of studies, it does not explicitly consider the role of 
institutional or governance quality variables in the process. Both globalization 
and democracy are important drivers of sustainability, while environmentalism 
is essential for the objective of gaining a “better world”. Governance quality is 
expected to be the key, not only for economic purposes, but also for the 
efficiency of environmental policies. To that end, the analysis in this paper 
explores the link between governance quality and energy efficiency for the EU-
28 countries, spanning the period 1995 to 2014. The findings document that 
there is a nexus between energy efficiency and income, they move together: 
the most efficient countries are in the group with higher GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, the results show that governance quality is an important driver 
of energy efficiency and, hence, of environmental policies. 
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Nowadays, environmental policies are a significant cornerstone of a developed 
economy. As Jebli et al. (2016) illustrate the big problem is that the 
consumption of non-renewable energy (i.e., oil, coal, and natural gas) increases 
eco- nomic growth, but also increases  carbon  dioxide emissions. These emissions 
are considered as the main cause of global warming. Therefore, it is necessary to 
increase the energy efficiency and to find substitutable energy to the fossil one, 
such as renewable energy. Similarly, Lloyd (2017) notes that economic growth 
is associated with greater levels of energy consumption, but that, in turn, implies 
that there is a conflict between growth and the desire to reduce emissions. Bano 
et al. (2018) states the knowledge-based economies, advanced technology, and 
globalization motivate everyone to find the most appropriate way to maintain the 
competitive advantage, as well as carbon emissions miti- gation. 
In contrast, environmental  degradation  occurs  because  global  economies  plan 
to basically generate business  and  employment  opportunities,  rather  than to 
support the environmental quality at the first stages of development, Apergis    et al. 
(2018). In this work the authors conclude that by using clean/renewable 
technologies it can substantially reduce emissions of climate change pollutants; 
therefore, they recommend economies to increment energy consumption 
coming from renewable sources. But one challenge appears: Barros et al. 
(2013) and Apergis and Payne (2014) note that it is critical for the 
development of a sustainable energy consumption mix for policymakers to 
understand that pol- icy initiatives must focus on cost-effective renewable 
energy sources, as well as on technologies that can effectively compete with 
fossil fuel-based energy sources. 
From the above it is getting clear that energy sources play a pivotal role in 
environmental policies, and following certain authors, such as Aklin et al. 
(2013) or Bernauer and Koubi (2009), who defend that public opinion may 
be a powerful determinant of environmental policies in a developed country, it 
would be substantially interesting to explore the relationship between certain 
public sector variables and the energy sector, from an environmental point of  
view.  As  Blühdorn  and  Welsh  (2007)  argue,  we  are  in  a  new  era  and  eco- 
politics needs a new environmental sociology. Section 2 will further develop 
this idea. Basically, the aim of this study is to consider two important issues: 
first, whether the European Union is energetic-sustainable efficient, and 
second, whether the quality of governments can impact this efficiency. To the 
best of our knowledge, this work is the first to analyse the impact of 
governance indicators on sustainable efficiency in a country context. The 
findings document that the government quality variables can improve both 
environmental quality and energy efficiency, while they are equally important 
in explaining any improvements in the environmental quality. 
The remaining of the manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 further 
studies the theoretical framework and previous research in this field. Section 
3 describes the variables and data used, while Section 4 provides the 
methodological analysis, including the baseline results, as well as certain 
robustness checks. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis and discussion. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides certain implications. 
 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
Based on the above discussion, it emerges the concept of the environmental 
risk, defined as the probability of damages to any community, due to the 
vulnerability of its environmental components exposed to human activities. 
The onset of this risk implies that changes in the economic structure, as well 
as in the associated policies, should be carried out. For Greenpeace1 or NASA2, 
the solution comes from the energy sector with the use of renewable energy 
sources. In the European Union (EU) context, the Europe 2020 strategy is   a 
policy for years 2010-2020 that emphasizes smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth as a way to overcome any structural weaknesses in the European 




economy, to improve its competitiveness and productivity, and to underpin a 
sustainable social market economy3. Some of the principal goals of the Eu- 
rope 2020 strategy are the climate change and energy targets whose principal 
actions can be summarized into two major ways: diminishing the emissions 
to the atmosphere and increasing the energy efficiency of the countries. More 
specifically, there are three targets (for 2020) into this headline: i) diminishing 
the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 20% than 1990 levels, ii) increasing 
by 20% of renewable energies use, and iii) increasing by 20% total energy 
efficiency. For 2030, the targets expand: reduction by 40% of greenhouse gas 
emissions, level of EU energy from renewables at least of 27%, increase energy 
efficiency by 27-30% and there has to be a level of 15% of electricity inter- 
connection between the EU members. Thus, EU energy policies have three 
main goals: the security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability; Europe 
should become a sustainable, low-carbon and environmental-friendly economy, 
while it will lead the way in renewable energy production and the fight against 
global warming. The EU has provided some information about environmental 
and energy target objectives4: GHGs should be reduced by 18% between 1990- 
2012; renewables’ share should reach 14.1% in 2012, up from 8.5% in 2005, and 
energy efficiency is expected to improve by 18-19% by 2020. 
From the above it is clear that the energy sector plays a pivotal role in 
environmental policies. It will be highly interesting to investigate whether the 
energy sector exposes high efficiency, from an environmental point of view. In 
this line, previous research has focused on investigating the relationship be- 
tween energy consumption and economic growth and/or pollutant emissions 
(Ahmad et al. (2016); Apergis et al. (2018); Apergis and Payne (2014); Apergis 










Omer (2008); Sadorsky (2009b,a); Tugcu et al. (2012)), among others. 
Liobikienè and Butkus (2018) assume that both energy efficiency and 
renewable energy consumption are the main drivers that could resolve the 
problem of climate change. However, it can be considered that both factors 
are, in fact, similar. A large number of studies have already confirmed this 
bidirectional causality  (Liobikienè  and  Butkus  (2018);  Shahbaz  et  al.  (2013);  
Wang  et  al. (2015)). Mikayilov et al. (2018) note that a suitable environmental 
policy to reduce total CO2 emissions without harming economic growth is to  improve  
energy efficiency, which can be obtained by increasing optimal infrastructure 
investment and employing energy  conservative  policies  to  avoid  unnecessary  use 
of energy. Put differently, using less energy intensive technologies, minimizing the 
loss of power during distribution and transmission processes, and employing different 
tariff mechanisms  to  control  energy  use  are  some  applicable policies that are 
capable to increase energy efficiency, while Tajudeen et al. (2018) observe that 
energy efficiency improvements are most cost-effective and most readily 
scalable options to support sustainable growth. 
Apart from energy sources, a different strand of research has incorporated 
many factors in sustainable growth, such as innovations, population, financial 
variables, trade (Anderson and Mizak (2006); Begum et al. (2015); Komal 
and Abbas (2015); Nasreen and Anwar  (2014); Sohag et al. (2015); Wang    et 
al. (2016a,b), among others); nevertheless, there are also other relevant 
factors that could also impact the environmental enhancement. As we have 
already mentioned in the introductory Section, public opinion may be a 
powerful determinant of environmental policies in a developed country (Aklin 
et al. (2013); Bernauer and Koubi (2009)). Furthermore, Salahodjaev (2016) 
emphasizes globalization, democracy and the institutional environment as 
potential drivers of environmental sustainability. More specifically, 
institutional characteristics could be also important drivers in this field 
(Barbier (1997); Bhattarai and Hammig (2001); Deacon (1994); Norton (1998); 
Samuelson (1976)). Bhattarai and Hammig (2004) test that economic 
development is accompanied by the deterioration of environmental quality 
following an inverted U-shape (i.e., the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
hypothesis), while they assume that increases in income are associated with 
improvements in socio-political institutions, and concluding that the quality of 
governance is a critical determinant of environmental degradation (measured 
by deforestation). In contrast, eco- nomic freedom is a concept which can 
have differing relations with certain economic factors, such as income 
inequality, economic growth, democracy and human development. Eastin and 
Prakash (2013) explore the relationship be- tween economic growth and an 
important component of economic freedom, that of gender inequality. Their 
findings illustrate that the relationship be- tween these two variables is very 
complex and has to be taken explicitly into account by policymakers. Li et al. 
(1998) find that there is solid evidence for a close association between income 
inequality and democracy: the rich are able to exercise  sufficient  control  over  
economic  policy  at  least  to  maintain  their wealth [...], again reinforcing the 
tendency for unequal distributions of  income. Apergis and Cooray (2017) and 
Apergis et al. (2014) investigate the 





nexus between income inequality and the economic freedom index and they 
document that there is an inverse relationship between them. Farzin and Bond 
(2006) put forward an important issue: As a general rule, political and civil 
liberties are instrumentally powerful in protecting the environmental resource- 
base, at least when compared with the absence of such liberties in countries run by 
authoritarian regimes. This observation raises several important questions: How 
does pubic environmental policy influence the relationship between per capita 
income and pollution? 
Institutional variables have been extensively considered in the economic 
and political structure relationships (Berggren (2003); Chortareas et al. (2016, 
2011, 2012, 2013); De Haan et al. (2006); Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003); 
Gwartney et al. (2006); Lin et al. (2016); Pitlik (2002)), among others. Because 
environmental quality may be considered as a public good, environmental 
policies are at least partly influenced by the society’s preferences for 
environmental quality, while they reflect the degree of democratization, as 
well as the quality of political institutions (Farzin and Bond (2006)). Rivera-
Batiz (2002) ex- presses that one of the major determinants of environmental 
policy is the socio-political regime of a particular country (i.e., the quality of 
governance). Furthermore, Magnani (2000) argues that well-defined property 
rights, democratic voting systems, and the respect of human rights can 
generate synergies that lead to increased levels and the efficacy of 
environmental policies. In addition, as Gnonlonfin et al. (2017) or Dinda 
(2004) highlight, the presence of the relation between income and pollution 
depends on certain traditional factors, such as technology, trade, etc., as well 
as on the role of the State, institutions and regulation policies. Tajudeen et al. 
(2018) conclude that non-economic factors (such as, the characteristics of 
consumers in relevance to their preferences or their environmental 
awareness) have a significant influence on energy demand and, hence, on CO2 
emissions, while they document that these factors have a direct influence on 
environmental damage. Hence, it is clear that energy use affects sustainability 
across all its fundamental components, society, environment and economy 
(Tronchin et al. (2018)). Additionally, the current literature hypothesizes that 
the membership in international organizations tends to improve both the 
environmental performance and the likelihood of joining international 
environmental treaties (Shahbaz et al. (2018); and reference therein). 
Therefore, our study focuses on the EU, which may be considered one of the 
international organizations more awareness of sound environmental practices. 
Finally, effective policies would have a positive effect on environmental 
conservation, especially, for countries that exhibit carbon-emitting attitudes 
(Tajudeen et al. (2018)), like the EU-28 club. It is clear that one of the keys in 
environmental improvement is the energy sector, and more specifically, its 
energy efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to clarify whether institutional 
variables have any influence on energy efficiency: the major question this study 
poses is whether certain characteristics of institutions, as corruption and/or 
rule of law play a pivotal role in environmental damage. We could consider 
that such variables are substantially relevant, especially, in the energy sector, 





which has been traditionally a very concentrated sector and with a high level 
of intervention from the governments’ side. EU energy policies have three 
main goals: the security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability; all these 
ensure a secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy environment for all 
EU citizens and businesses: Europe should become a sustainable, low-carbon 
and environmentally friendly place, and it should lead the way in renewable 
energy production, as well as the fight against global warming5. In the EU 
context, it is clear that the energy sector plays a key role in climate change 
and environmental damage, and furthermore, the governments have to ensure 
that their energy objectives are fully met in an efficient and coherent way.   To 
that end, it is highly important to observe whether this sector is efficient or it 
has to improve its efficiency, while we simultaneously need to explore 
whether the individual qualitative characteristics of the member governments 
can impact its efficiency. 
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to analyse the effect of 
governance quality on environmental degradation, particularly, on environ- 
mental and energy efficiency in the context of EU. The analysis covers all 
members of the EU-28, except Malta, spanning the period 2002 to 2014. 
The analysis will investigate the validity of the following two principal 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Can the energy sector improve its “sustainable” efficiency? and 
Hypothesis 2: Is governance quality important in explaining the efficiency in 
the energy sector? 
The results document that the government quality variables are capable 
of improving both environmental quality and energy efficiency, while they are 
important in explaining any improvements in the environment. 
 
 
3 Data and variables 
 
3.1 The dependent variable: the DEA and energy efficiency sustainable index 
 
The first part of the methodology measures the energy efficiency sustainable 
index. To that end, it employs the methodology of Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) approach, proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a well-established 
non-parametric frontier approach that assesses and measures the relative 
efficiency of a set of comparable entities (called Decision Making Units or 
DMUs) featured with multiple factors grouped into two categories: inputs and 
outputs. Classical DEA models rely on the assumption that inputs have to be 
minimized and outputs have to be maximized (Vencheh et al. (2005)). Thus, 
in the standard DEA model, decreases in outputs are not allowed; only inputs 
are allowed to decrease (similarly, increases in inputs are not allowed, while 
only outputs are allowed to increase) (Seiford and Zhu (2002)), but the 
production process could generate also undesirable outputs (pollutants). 
5 https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/ 





There are several approaches for incorporating undesirable outputs in DEA 
modelling approach. These models can also be classified into two groups: the 
ones that take an indirect perspective and the ones that take a direct 
approach. As Scheel (2001) argues, indirect approaches transform the values 
of the undesirable outputs through a monotone decreasing function, such that 
the transformed data can be included as desirable outputs in the technology 
set; direct approaches can use the original output data set, but modify the 
assumptions about the structure of the technology set in order to treat the 
undesirable outputs appropriately. As Scheel (2001) remarks, the indirect 
approaches assume that the transformed data have their own meaning; for 
instance, if we transform the undesirable output mortality rate, then we can 
study the desirable output survival rate. In contrast, the direct approach 
employs the original output set, but it changes the assumptions adopted. The 
direct approach, suggested  by  Färe  et  al.  (1989),  replaces  the  strong  
disposability  of  outputs  by the assumption that outputs are weakly disposable, 
while only the sub-vector of desirable outputs is strongly disposable. The 
direct approach is preferable implying that it is not necessary for researchers 
to make any changes to the main dataset, while it is not necessary to 
reinterpret the results obtained in terms of the “new” variables (e.g., mortality 
and survival rates). The analysis in this work makes use of DEA method, 
focusing on the direct approach, to calculate the energy efficiency sustainable 
index across the EU-28 members. It considers one of the models developed by 
Zhou and Ang (2008), who measure the energy efficiency performances of 21 
OECD countries. The reason of using this particular model given that the 
analysis focuses on the technical efficiency of energy consumption. The 
technical efficiency is defined as the ability of a DMU to obtain maximal 
outputs (or minimal inputs) from a given set of in- puts (or a given set of 
outputs (Robaina-Alves et al. (2015); Moutinho et al. (2017)). The principal 
advantage of using the DEA method is its flexibility  to incorporate factors 
incomparable a priori (both inputs and outputs). That makes the results easily 
interpretable. As Balk et al. (2017) illustrate, the DEA method searches for the 
most favourable weight when evaluating a production unit, by constructing a 
virtual aggregate input to output productivity ratio, each constructed as a 
linear combination of observed values. 
Assume that the set of DMUs consists of DMUk, 𝑘𝑘 = 1,⋯𝐾𝐾. Let 𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =
(𝐱𝐱1𝑛𝑛 , 𝐱𝐱2𝑛𝑛 ,⋯ , 𝐱𝐱𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛), 𝐞𝐞𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 = (𝐞𝐞1𝑛𝑛 , 𝐞𝐞2𝑛𝑛,⋯ , 𝐞𝐞𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛), 𝐲𝐲𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = (𝐲𝐲1𝑛𝑛, 𝐲𝐲2𝑛𝑛,⋯ , 𝐲𝐲𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛) 
and 𝐮𝐮𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 = �𝐮𝐮1𝑛𝑛 , 𝐮𝐮2𝑛𝑛 ,⋯ ,𝐮𝐮𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛� are the vectors of non-energy inputs, energy 
inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs, respectively. The 
efficiency score of DMUi can be obtained by solving model (1) below. 





min𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖              𝑟𝑟. 𝑡𝑡. 
















𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝐾𝐾 (1) 
 
It can be seen that [model (1)] attempts to proportionally contract the amounts 
of energy inputs as much as possible for a given level of non-energy inputs, 
desirable and undesirable outputs. It provides an aggregated and standardized 
index for measuring energy efficiency performance (Zhou and Ang (2008); pp. 
2913). The higher value is, the better situation for each DMU is. The 
maximum possible value is one, which implies that the DMU is relatively 
efficient, regarding the rest of DMUs. In contrast, if the value of the index 
is zero (the minimum possible value), it implies that the DMU is relatively 
inefficient. 
It is important to remark that the DEA approach has certain limitations, 
despite the attractiveness of its application. More specifically, the weight 
flexibility, previously explained, may lead to unreasonable results, 
inconsistent with any prior knowledge of the production process (Balk et al. 
(2017)); in that sense the results must be analysed carefully and comparing 
them with the theoretical framework and previous research. Our case does not 
encounter this problem and the results are consistent (Sections 4 and 5). In 
addition, it does not allow the comparison of different results “externally”; 
the results of the analysis can be only compared “internally” in a sense that 
we are not able to compare the findings with any other dataset, which would 
offer other different scores. DEA measures the relative efficiency of DMUs 
that perform similar type of functions and have identical goals and objectives; 
for instance, if we analyse a particular group of countries, we may not compare 
these results with any other groups, even in the case we add only an additional 
country. Apart from this little inconvenience, the use of DEA provides the 
flexibility of the application: it is not necessary to explicitly specify a priori a 
production function that explains how the inputs and outputs of the 
production units are linked to each other (Cecchini et al. (2018)). 
Furthermore, DEA has emerged in recent years as a highly sophisticated 
method to assess efficiency measures, 






and particularly, environmental efficiency across countries and economic sec- 
tors (Robaina-Alves et al. (2015)). 
Once the methodology is clarified, this part defines the index. The data 
used for obtaining the dependent variable include, as we have anticipated, 
non-energy and energy inputs, as well as two types of outputs, i.e. desirable 
and undesirable, to measure the sustainable efficiency. In the case of energy 
inputs, we have two groups of variables: first, we get the efficiency scores using 
group 1 (with only one energy input: energy use), and then using group 2 (with 
two energy inputs: energy consumption distinguishing between fossil and non- 
fossil energies). The final dependent variable (called E in following Sections) 
is the average of these two energy efficiency scores. The reason of building the 
dependent variable as above is to balance the energy efficiency results for 
dealing with the weight flexibility problem previously mentioned. Next, the 
factors are measured as follows6: 
– Non-energy inputs: 
– Labor force (total, people ages 15 and older). 
– Gross capital formation (% of GDP). 
– Energy inputs: 
– Group 1: Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita). 
– Group 2: 
Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total). 
Renewable energy consumption (% of total). 
– Desirable output: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $). 
– Undesirable output: CO2 emissions (kt). 
The analysis will provide the results for the energy efficiency sustainable 
index (E) across the different members of EU-28 (excluding Malta) for each 
year, from 1995 to 2014 (last data available for CO2 emissions). Malta has 
been excluded due to certain data unavailability. The dependent variable, E, is 
called throughout the paper as sustainable or environmental energy efficiency 
because of the incorporation of the undesirable output, CO2 emissions, which 
allows to obtain the energy efficiency scores taking into account the ecological 
effect of the economy on the environment. The results are reported in Table 
1. In addition, Figures 1 and 2 display the average of each country and the 
average of each year for the total EU-28 (excluding Malta), respectively. 
As mentioned above, we should take into consideration that DEA can 
measure “relative” efficiency, but not “absolute” efficiency. It compares an 
operating unit to a subset of peers and not to a theoretical maximum 
performance (Colbert et al. (2000)). Thus, there is always a gap to improve in 
the real life. There is the possibility that coming years are more efficient than 
the previous, hence, the efficiency scores are expected to change. This further 
clarification is very important for the first hypothesis that the energy sector 
can improve its “sustainable” efficiency: the DEA method allows us to  display 
that there 
6 Our data are available in the World Bank website (http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
data/source/world-development-indicators). 
• 























Fig. 1 Average of Energy Efficiency Scores for each member: EU-28 (excluding Malta), 1995-
2014. 
 



































Table 1 Energy Efficiency Scores for EU-28 (excluding Malta). 1995-2014. 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Austria 0.7117 0.7149 0.6987 0.6747 0.6701 0.6845 0.6467 0.667 0.6535 0.658 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bulgaria 0.2101 1 0.2205 0.2308 0.223 0.2287 0.2259 0.2432 0.2557 0.2609 
Croatia 0.39 0.432 0.4187 0.4143 0.3937 0.4204 0.4062 0.4131 0.429 0.4122 
Cyprus 0.7389 0.6831 0.7565 0.8878 0.8313 0.8869 0.7092 0.6707 0.6717 0.6765 
Czech Republic 0.6603 0.5845 0.7993 0.6124 0.5214 0.8296 0.7749 0.8624 0.8591 0.7423 
Denmark 0.7738 0.8109 0.7692 0.7309 0.7401 0.7578 0.717 0.7455 0.738 0.7696 
Estonia 0.4903 0.5237 0.5733 0.4932 0.4597 0.4977 0.4999 0.564 0.6696 0.7035 
Finland 0.5864 0.6693 0.6952 0.6482 0.648 0.6079 0.63 0.7749 0.9276 0.9446 
France 0.823 0.81 0.8236 0.8301 0.8389 0.8428 0.833 0.8357 0.8473 0.843 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greece 0.5481 0.5737 0.5609 0.5577 0.5491 0.543 0.5404 0.552 0.5896 0.5756 
Hungary 0.3758 0.383 0.3855 0.4064 0.3989 0.4219 0.4096 0.4227 0.4442 0.4397 
Ireland 0.8018 0.7398 0.9105 0.9674 0.9982 1 0.9242 0.7803 0.7637 0.7668 
Italy 0.8417 0.8406 0.8396 0.8405 0.8389 0.839 0.837 0.8426 0.8519 0.8523 
Latvia 0.2469 0.2714 0.2865 0.3082 0.3231 0.3481 0.3387 0.3655 0.3935 0.3874 
Lithuania 0.2525 0.2673 0.2827 0.2926 0.3011 0.3342 0.314 0.3302 0.3681 0.3593 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1 1 0.9564 0.982 0.999 0.9429 0.8571 0.9107 0.9364 0.9946 
Poland 0.4974 0.4959 0.5012 0.4911 0.4972 0.4966 0.4966 0.4985 0.5086 0.5226 
Portugal 0.5908 0.6486 0.6244 0.611 0.5745 0.5887 0.576 0.558 0.5845 0.5428 
Romania 0.3174 0.3207 0.3158 0.327 0.3465 0.3484 0.356 0.361 0.3817 0.3986 
Slovak Republic 0.2744 0.2998 0.3038 0.3447 0.3179 0.3286 0.2965 0.3079 0.3341 0.3325 
Slovenia 0.3923 0.4139 0.4048 0.417 0.4153 0.4328 0.4174 0.4302 0.4512 0.4305 
Spain 0.6751 0.6976 0.6813 0.6896 0.6885 0.6893 0.6902 0.6963 0.718 0.7082 
Sweden 0.7532 0.7574 0.7591 0.7379 0.746 0.7697 0.7378 0.7466 0.7693 0.7717 
United Kingdom 0.8912 0.8866 0.9119 0.9088 0.9562 0.9573 0.9589 0.9548 0.9823 1 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Austria 0.6598 0.6813 0.6768 0.6872 0.7047 0.6712 0.6653 0.6723 0.6235 0.6102 
Belgium 1 1 0.9259 1 1 1 1 0.922 0.8331 0.7809 
Bulgaria 0.2676 0.2757 0.2887 0.313 0.336 0.3278 0.3123 0.3223 0.3217 0.3057 
Croatia 0.418 0.4316 0.4345 0.4637 0.4528 0.4391 0.4369 0.4461 0.4165 0.4155 
Cyprus 0.6778 0.675 0.6662 0.6725 0.6789 0.6706 0.665 0.6629 0.6487 0.6421 
Czech Republic 0.9677 1 1 1 0.959 0.825 0.9495 0.7885 0.5341 0.5829 
Denmark 0.7785 0.7499 0.7254 0.7401 0.7555 0.7184 0.7131 0.7521 0.6823 0.7099 
Estonia 0.7777 0.7346 0.9578 0.8877 0.7783 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland 0.6847 1 0.8222 0.7756 0.7847 0.8595 0.8372 0.6748 0.6173 0.5764 
France 0.849 0.8527 0.8595 0.8601 0.8641 0.8604 0.8643 0.863 0.8565 0.8484 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greece 0.6043 0.5893 0.6524 0.6406 0.6841 0.5794 0.5183 0.4887 0.4852 0.478 
Hungary 0.4385 0.4476 0.4502 0.4668 0.4716 0.4504 0.4546 0.4672 0.4643 0.4652 
Ireland 0.7745 0.7692 0.7934 0.7576 0.7542 0.7443 0.7491 0.7595 0.7537 0.7649 
Italy 0.863 0.8467 0.9249 0.8391 0.838 0.8269 0.8265 0.8151 0.8026 0.7872 
Latvia 0.4144 0.4418 0.4701 0.4824 0.4457 0.4025 0.4413 0.4578 0.4371 0.441 
Lithuania 0.3785 0.401 0.4174 0.4403 0.4254 0.4351 0.4424 0.4566 0.4587 0.4655 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1 0.9842 0.9771 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland 0.5308 0.5435 0.5648 0.5633 0.5875 0.5869 0.6092 0.5939 0.5963 0.6172 
Portugal 0.5288 0.5468 0.5529 0.5745 0.576 0.5866 0.5709 0.5721 0.5298 0.5223 
Romania 0.4112 0.4246 0.4489 0.489 0.5123 0.4896 0.4773 0.4901 0.5103 0.5071 
Slovak Republic 0.3438 0.3679 0.4035 0.4296 0.4411 0.4325 0.4432 0.4656 0.4404 0.4558 
Slovenia 0.436 0.4465 0.4643 0.4762 0.4803 0.4619 0.4596 0.4552 0.4283 0.441 
Spain 0.7245 0.7254 0.734 0.7399 0.7501 0.7376 0.7163 0.7037 0.6997 0.6925 
Sweden 0.7732 0.7985 0.7896 0.7877 0.7987 0.7737 0.7655 0.7596 0.7453 0.7514 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
is always the capability of improving our practices. Thus, the first hypothesis 
can be interpreted as correct. Once energy efficiency scores of the entire EU 
are obtained, the next step of the analysis is to estimate model (2), described 
in Subsection 3.2. 
 
 
3.2 The independent variables and the modelling methodology 
 
Next, after obtaining the energy efficiency sustainable index, the analysis 
explores whether the governance quality variables can explain this type of 
efficiency. Governance quality can be interpreted as the ability of the 
Government to ensure a framework for inhabitants of a country live justly. In 
the words of The Quality of Government (QoG) Institute, governance quality 
lie 





in trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government 
institutions. 
The methodology used for obtaining the results is explained in Section 4. 
Therefore, our primary model will be that of Model (2), defined as follows: 
 
𝐄𝐄 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈+ 𝐮𝐮, (2) 
where variables are described below. Data are obtained from the World 
Bank public database7 and the Fraser Institute8, while they are all on an 
annual basis. 
– E: Energy efficiency sustainable index. 
– I1: Corruption. Taking the definition of the World Bank, Control of 
Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
– I2: Regulatory quality. Taking the definition of the World Bank, Regulatory 
Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
– I3: Economic freedom index. The index is obtained from Fraser Institute 
and, according to the organisation, it measures the degree of economic 
freedom present in five major areas: size of government, legal system and 
security of property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally 
and corruption. 
– u: the error term. 
The analysis spans the period 2002-2014, based on data availability. 
I1 and I2 are two of the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by 
the World Bank. Variable I3, developed by the Fraser Institute, is the general 
variable that measures what we have named as quality of Government. The 
rationale for introducing also I1 and I2 is the importance of these two 
variables in a country and for governance quality particularly (it is interesting 
to study their individual effect on E). The World Bank also developed four 
more indicators: government effectiveness, rule of law political stability and 
voice and accountability. The two first we consider that they are measured by 
the three variables used, thus if we introduce these two as well, we may add 
redundant information. The two last World Bank indicators reflect severe 
problems of democracy and freedom, that is not the case of the European 
Union. 
Regarding the expected importance of each variable, we may anticipate 
that variables I1 and I2 could be the most relevant because they are more 
specific than I3, which includes more aspects of the economy that could not 
be influential for sustainable energy efficiency. In Section 5 we will deep into 










Table 2 Panel unit root test (p-values). 
 
Variable P MP IN L 
I1 0.006 0.002 0.178 0.175 
I2 0.012 0.006 0.258 0.212 
I3 0 0 0 0 
P: inverse chi-squared test; MP: modifted P test; IN: inverse normal test; L: logit test. 
I1: Control of Corruption; I2: Regulatory Quality; I3: Economic Freedom Index. 
 
 
4 Methodological analysis and final results 
 
Four panel unit root tests are considered: the inverse chi-squared test (P) 
proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and called the P test by Choi (2001), the 
modified P test (MP), the inverse normal test (IN), and the logit test (L), all 
three proposed by Choi (2001). Table 2 shows the panel unit root results. They 
clearly document that the variables I1 and I2 have a unit root in their levels 
and, thus, we consider their first differences for the next steps of the empirical 
analysis. 
Next, we need to choose the best methodology for our panel dataset; thus, 
the analysis runs three test hypotheses for both datasets: 
– F Test for individual and/or time effects: if we reject the null hypothesis, 
then the best option is to use the within model, if not, the pooling model. 
– Lagrange Multiplier test for panel models (Breusch-Pagan test, Breusch 
and Pagan (1980)): if we reject the null hypothesis, then the best option is 
to use Generalized Least Squares (GLS), if not, the pooling model. 
– Hausman test for panel models: if we reject the null hypothesis, then the 
best option is to use within model, if not, GLS. 
In these three tests, the p-values obtained are lower than 0.5, which 
indicates that the best method to use is Fixed Effects (the within model). The 
results are reported in Table 3. 
The three explanatory variables are expected to have a positive impact  on 
energy efficiency, which implies that higher levels of governance quality 
(measured as high control of corruption, quality of laws or economic freedom) 
would infer higher efficiency of the energy sector and, hence, there would  be 
higher levels of sustainable growth in the countries under consideration. 
However, the estimates results illustrate that the control of corruption carries 
a negative sign. This fact could be caused by a specific problem of the model: 
the presence of multicollinearity. 
A priori, we could think that the institutional/government quality 
variables are highly collinear to each other; therefore, it is important to check 
the presence of collinearity in the study and, if it exists, to apply a specific 
methodology to deal with it. Although there have been some traditional 
methods applied in the presence of collinearity, such as ridge regression and 
partial least squares (PLS), these methods present some inconveniences and 
faults (Artigue and Smith (2019); Garć ıa et al. (2015); Garć ıa et al. (2017); 















Adjusted R2 -0.079 
F statistic 1.772 
p-value (of F ) 0.152 
AIC - 
BIC - 
***, **, *, 
+
 Statistically signiftcant at 0.001 (99.9% level of conftdence), at 0.01 (99% level of 
conftdence), at 0.05 (95% level of conftdence) and at 0.1 (90% level of conftdence), respectively. 
Values of the t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
I1: Control of Corruption; I2: Regulatory Quality; I3: Economic Freedom Index. 
 
 
Salmerón  et  al.  (2016);  Salmerón  et  al.  (2016)).  There  is  a  “novel”  method 
called residualization (or also regression with orthogonal variables) to deal 
with collinearity. This methodology has been used in some previous research 
(Ambridge et al. (2012); Cohen-Goldberg (2012); Jaeger (2010); Jorgenson 
(2006); Jorgenson and Burns (2007); Jorgenson and Clark (2009); Kentor and 
Kick (2008); Kuperman et al. (2008, 2010); Lemhöfer et al. (2008)); however, 
these works do not use the method as in here and they only orthogonalize one 
or a few variables as a function of only one variable that is usually not included 
in the original model. One of the first comprehensive explanations of the 
method and characteristics are provided by Salmerón et al. (2016). 
Residualization substitutes one, some or all the variables with the residuals 
obtained from an auxiliary regression. Due to the properties of the OLS 
estimation, the estimated residuals of any regression by OLS are orthogonal 
to all the explanatory variables used in the analysis. Thus, if the auxiliary 
model is estimated by OLS, the estimated residuals represent the part of the 
dependent variable that has no relation with the explanatory variables used. 
Indeed, if we orthogonalize our explanatory variables in the model, each 
explanatory variable is completely independent in the model: the principle, 
ceteris paribus, is strictly fulfilled and there are no relationships between 
explanatory variables in the regression model; in that sense, the variables are 
totally independent to each other and potential multicollinearity problems 
are mitigated. It is worth noting the interpretative point of view of this 
method. The researcher chooses the “correct” variable(s) to be isolated: not 
all the variables may be “deconstructed” by deleting some of them, in a way 
that researchers must be careful with the choosing variable. Additionally, 
with the residualization method we obtain the same estimated residuals for 
both the initial and the modified model, and provided that we are using the 
same explained variable, 






















AIC -18.961 -18.961 
BIC -12.482 -12.482 
***, **, *, 
+
 Statistically signiftcant at 0.001 (99.9% level of conftdence), at 0.01 (99% level of 
conftdence), at 0.05 (95% level of conftdence) and at 0.1 (90% level of conftdence), respectively. 
Values of the t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
I1: Control of Corruption; I2: Regulatory Quality; I3: Economic Freedom Index. 
 
 
we obtain the same values for the global characteristics of the model (F statis- 
tic, R2, etc.). Moreover, since residualization uses OLS properties, hereinafter 
the analysis takes the mean of the period for each variable (cross-sectional 
data). 
Before applying the residualization method, it is imperative to check out 
the presence of multicollinearity. One of the most widely applied measures to 
detect collinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The VIF, presented 
by Marquardt (1970), is usually taken the value of 10 as the frontier; any 
values higher than 10 detect collinearity problems. The VIFs for the variables, 
after calculating the mean for the period in all of them, are higher than 10 for 
one of the three explanatory variables (i.e., VIFI1 = 8.226, VIFI2 = 16.157 and 
VIFI3 = 5.008), so it is a sign of strong collinearity across all variables. The 
results of residualization, along with those of OLS, are reported in Table 4. 
The results highlight satisfactory values in relevance to collinearity 
problems. In particular, the VIFs results are lower than 10 (i.e., VIFI1 = VIFI3 
= 2.094, VIFI2 = 1.000). Regarding the expected signs, it would be logical 
that all governance quality coefficients have a positive sign, which is the case 
of these new results. This implies that increments in each explanatory 
variable would make the dependent variable (i.e., energy improvements or 
energy efficiency) higher. Finally, as a disadvantage of these results, we can 
see that the estimated parameters are not all of them individually significant, 
although we have a good model: we have  an acceptable R2 taking into account 
that we  are only studying the influence of institutional variables on energy 
efficiency and our model is globally significant. We conclude that our 
variables are im- 
Variable OLS Residualization 
Intercept 1.172 -0.160 
(0.937) (-0.177) 
I1 0.022 0.164 ** 
(0.211) (3.067) 
I2 0.450 0.450 
(1.448) (1.548) 
I3 -0.142 0.090 
(-0.722) (0.709) 
R2 0.564 0.564 
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.507 
F statistic 9.912 9.912 
p-value (of F ) < 2.2 · 10−16 < 2.2 · 10−16 
 





Table 5 Individual simple regressions for each explanatory variable. 
Variable Estimated parameter R2 
I1 0.192 *** 0.509 
(5.090) 
I2 0.389 *** 0.548 
(5.503) 
I3 0.373 ** 0.340 
(3.589) 
***, **, *, + Statistically signiftcant at 0.001 (99.9% level of conftdence), at 0.01 (99% level of 
conftdence), at 0.05 (95% level of conftdence) and at 0.1 (90% level of conftdence), respectively. 
Values of the t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
I1: Control of Corruption; I2: Regulatory Quality; I3: Economic Freedom Index. 
 
 
portant in explaining the energy efficiency sustainable index, because on an 
individual basis (by studying three different simple linear regressions), each 
one contributes with an acceptable R2 to the dependent variable (Table 5). 
 
4.1 Robustness check: Alternative definitions of the independent variables 
 
To check the robustness of our baseline findings, this part of the analysis 
changes two of the three explanatory variables in model (2) by considering 
alternative definitions. The analysis maintains the definition of the I3 = Eco- 
nomic Freedom Index variable since, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
not any other alternative index available. The new variables, I1 and I2, are 
obtained from The Quality of Government (QoG) Institute9, and they are 
defined as follows: 
– I1: Public sector corruption Index. As the QoG Institute notes, the index 
is formed by taking the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor 
analysis model of the indicators for public sector bribery and embezzlement? 
– I2: Impartial administration. As the QoG Institute notes, this variable 
overlaps with the concept of the rule of law, thus it emphasizes the liberal 
aspects of democracy. 
– I3: Economic freedom index. 
It is important to note that our primary goal is to determine whether the 
characteristics of governments have any influence on energy efficiency, and 
hence, on the environmental degradation. As mentioned in the Introduction 
Section, there are certain important government characteristics that could 
potentially affect environmental sustainability, such as the quality of political 
institutions or governance, well-defined property rights, the role of the State 
or the Government, etc., (Magnani (2000); Rivera-Batiz (2002); Dinda (2004); 
Farzin and Bond (2006); Gnonlonfin et al. (2017)). 
9 https://qog.pol.gu.se/data 



















Adjusted R2 0.096 
F statistic 12.131 
p-value (of F ) < 2.2 10−16 
AIC  - 
BIC - 
***, **, *, + Statistically signiftcant at 0.001 (99.9% level of conftdence), at 0.01 (99% level of 
conftdence), at 0.05 (95% level of conftdence) and at 0.1 (90% level of conftdence), respectively. 
Values of the t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
I1: Public Sector Corruption Index; I2: Impartial Administration; I3: Economic Freedom Index. 
 
 
The new dataset spans the period 2000 to 2014 and only 21 countries out 
of the EU-28. Table 6 includes only panel data estimations, considering the 
estimation by random effects. The findings indicate the presence of similar 
results as before. Furthermore, the estimates do not display any 
multicollinearity across the new variables. In terms of the GLS model, it is 
clearly documented that all of the governance quality variables are 
statistically significant at least at 10% in explaining energy efficiency scores. 
The findings illustrate the expected signs. Finally, as a disadvantage, the use 
of these new variables leads to a low R2, although the model is globally 
significant. This fact can be provoked by data unavailability and a smaller 
sample, thus, we conclude that the best definition of the independent variable 
comes from the first one. Overall, the second hypothesis can be interpreted as 
accepted, i.e. institutional or governance quality variables are important in 
explaining efficiency scores in the energy sector. 
 
 
5 Empirical analysis 
 
In terms of energy efficiency scores, the results indicated that the most energy 
efficient countries are Germany and Luxembourg, followed by the Netherlands, 
the UK and Belgium. By contrast, the worst energy efficient country member 
is Bulgaria, followed by Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Latvia. Therefore, it 
is obvious that there are two groups of countries in relevance to the efficiency 
of their energy sector, while there is a nexus between energy efficiency and 
income. In other words, while the most efficient countries are in the group of 





the countries with higher GDP per capita on average, the inefficient energy 
economies are in the group with smaller GDP per capita. With a lower GDP 
per capita, the country has less available resources to invest in new energy 
technologies and technologies environmentally friendly. The findings also 
indicated that the energy efficiency scores did not change dramatically 
through the time span under consideration (they took values between 0.6 and 
0.7), but it could be appreciate that the most efficient years were those of 
2007, 2008 and 2009, while the worst values were at the beginning of the 
time period. The controversial issue here is the most efficient years, because we 
do not have an increasing tendency regarding the efficiency scores: the results 
presented a raising trend until 2009, when the values started to decrease again. 
A potential explanation could be the economic (both financial and sovereign 
debt) crisis in Europe during those years; it is expected, that the end of the 
crisis will contribute to the increase of those efficiency scores again. 
In terms of the role of governance quality variables, we have different results 
depending on the method applied, but the main estimation results (fixed effects 
for panel data and residualization for cross-sectional data) indicated that: 
– With higher levels for the control of corruption, which captures the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gains, it is likely that 
governments invest properly quantities in each sector, not only in those 
where the public has strong invested interests. Particularly, this fact is 
very important in the energy sector where with a stronger control of 
corruption there would be more investments on the research in new 
technologies and clean energies than in traditional ones (i.e., coal). The 
results just confirm this with a positive value of the estimated parameter 
in the residualization estimates (i.e., a higher control of corruption is 
beneficial for energy efficiency). 
– Regulatory quality captures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector developments. This implies that a higher quality of such policies, are 
expected to lead to similar results as before, while the energy sector will 
turn out to be more efficient. Once again, the estimates just confirm this 
hypothesis through the positive value of the estimated parameter. 
– Finally, the Economic Freedom Index measures the degree of economic 
freedom in a country. As this index is interpreted as the degree of 
democracy in a country, higher levels of the index are expected to improve 
the efficiency in the energy sector. The estimates also confirm this 
hypothesis through the positive value of the estimated parameter. 
In terms of the importance of the independent variables used for 
explaining the sustainable or environmental energy efficiency scores, E, in 
Section 4 we have concluded that our variables are important in explaining 
the energy efficiency sustainable index, because each one contributes with an 
acceptable R2 to the dependent variable (Table 5). Furthermore, in Section 3.2 
we have anticipated that variables I1 and I2 could be the most relevant 
because they are more specific than I3, which includes more aspects of the 
economy that 





could not be influential for sustainable energy efficiency. Table 5 shows that 
variables I1 and I2 are the most important in the study: the correspondent 
parameters are statistically significant with a confidence level of 99.9%, while 
the parameter of variable I3 is statistically significant with a confidence level 
of 99%. This fact means the three variables are relevant, but I1 and I2 predict 
more proportion of the variance in the dependent variable, E, than I3. 
 
 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The paper attempted to investigate the empirical role of certain institutional 
variables for energy efficiency across all members of the EU-28 (excluding 
Malta). Overall, the empirical evidence indicated that the hypothesis that 
effective policies would have a positive effect on environmental conservation, 
especially for countries that exhibit carbon-emitting attitudes (Tajudeen et al. 
(2018)), like the EU-28 group. With the principal goal of clarifying the role of 
governance quality variables in energy efficiency, we first obtained environmental 
energy efficiency scores across all members of the EU-28 (excluding Malta due 
to data unavailability) over the period 1995-2014. The use of environmental 
DEA, which employs not only desirable outputs, but also undesirable ones, to 
calculate the scores can be interpreted as an actual trend. We concluded from 
the efficiency scores that efficiency in the energy sector and income levels 
move together. Additionally, as it has been said in Section 3.1, the DEA 
method allows us to display that there is always the capability of improving our 
practices. Thus, by using this method to obtain the energy efficiency scores, 
the first hypothesis can be interpreted as correct: there is a gap to improve the 
energy sector in terms of sustainable efficiency. Once the efficiency scores were 
obtained, the analysis estimated how governance quality impacted efficiency 
scores. The findings indicated that they played a key role in explaining the 
environmental energy efficiency. Hence, the second hypothesis of the work, can 
be interpreted as correct as well: governance quality is important in explaining 
the sustainable efficiency of the energy sector. 
The energy sector is a fundamental part of environmental policies, because 
the improvement on environment is generally due to the decrease of green- 
house gas (GHG) emissions. Lesser GHG emissions should come from a strong 
and innovative energy sector. As we have stated in the Introduction, a large 
number of studies have already confirmed the bidirectional causality between 
energy sector and environmental policies, so the reader could think both the 
energy sector plays a pivotal role in environmental policies and environmental 
policies regulate energy sector. Anyway, with the presence of better 
institutions, investments in various economic sectors should be fair and 
appropriate. Particularly, in the case of the EU-28, that has a pro-active 
environmentalism and climate change is a challenge for this group of countries. 
Any improvements in governance quality are expected to positively impact on 
energy efficiency. However, the big question that arises is: how these 
countries might improve their practices to that end? When some governments 
pass a new law across all 





sectors in the economy (i.e., environment, energy, education, health, economy, 
democracy, etc,), the first objective is to test whether the actions associated 
with it have any practical implications. In line with this, it is worthwhile to 
delve into the rebound effect. As Greening et al. (2000) (and references therein) 
said, the term was first applied  narrowly  to  the  direct  increase  in  demand  for an 
energy service whose supply had increased as a result of improvements in technical 
efficiency in the use of energy. In future research, this rebound or “take-back” 
effect will be interesting to study as well. Apart from this ef- fect, a handy 
question would be to ask whether the law is efficient, taking into account all 
relevant variables and other policies that affect the new one. Moreover, we 
need to explore whether it has changed something, or the new practices have 
maintained the country as the starting point. It is clear that we have studied 
the EU-28 which is a group of developed countries with strong levels of 
democracy, while they have to fulfil some tight and good practices to remain 
within, so the controversial issue here is that countries must developed 
practical and useful actions, and test if they achieve the expected results. All 
the previous means that the first step when a new practice is implemented by 
the Government, has to be to increment the “power” of it, does it work? If it 
does, quality of governments will be higher and perceptions of inhabitants and 
“neighbours” about the country, in general, and Government, in particular, 
will be better. This is essential in the way to make a better world, not only  for 
energy sector or environmental issues, but also for other aspects of the 
economy, like education in example. 
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